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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
whole service is rendered illegal and no recovery is permitted. 12 The
broker who performs such a service is deemed to be doing it gratis13
Even in an agreement where the broker is not to be paid until title
passes, if he did not have a license at the time of performing the
services, he cannot recover. 14 The instant case then, follows the long
line of decisions, in agreeing that the broker must be possessed of his
license during entire time of the performance of his services. But it
goes a step farther, too, and states that these services do not begin
with the employment but from the time the broker works to procure a
customer for his principal. This decision introduces the latest refine-
ment in the theory and is in all justice to both broker and client.
E. H. S.
CONDITIONAL SALES-PERSONAL PROPERTY-FIXTURE STATUTE
INAPPLICABLE TO GAS RANGEs.-Plaintiff sought an injunction re-
straining defendant from removing eighty-three gas ranges installed
by the usual means in an apartment house of which plaintiff was
owner, under a contract of conditional sale between the builder of
the apartment house, who was plaintiff's vendor, and the defendafit.
The stoves had been installed by defendant pursuant to the contract
of sale whereby the plaintiff's vendor covenanted to complete the
then partially constructed building and finish it "in a fashion similar
to buildings of the same type in said location." Some time after the
conveyance to plaintiff, the builder defaulted in his payments on the
gas ranges and went into bankruptcy. Defendant then, for the first
time, filed his conditional bill of sale of the stoves, reserving title in
himself and took steps to regain possession of them. Held, the reser-
vation of title in the conditional vendor was invalid against plaintiff,
a purchaser in good faith, for value without notice of the conditional
seller's rights. Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y.
450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930).
Gas ranges have already been denominated personal property'
and the nature of property having a determinate legal character can-
' Roman v. Lobe, supra Note 3 (broker's license expired before he per-
formed his services; he renewed it before bringing his action; held, he could
not recover part of services being illegally rendered) ; Bendell v. DeDominicis,
stupra Note 5 (where broker was licensed when employed and when contract of
sale was signed, but not when he produced customer; he could not recover);
Goldin v. Shankroff, 125 Misc. 822, 211 N. Y. Supp. 569 (2nd Dept., 1925)
(where services were performed while broker was unlicensed, commission was
not to be paid until title passed; he had license when title passed but could not
recover. Court holding he must have license when services are performed).
3Stake v. Roth, 91 Misc. 45, 154 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dept., 1915),
supra Note 6.
" Goldin v. Shankroff, supra Note 12.
'Central Union Gas Company v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10. 103 N. E. 822
(1913); Madfes v. Beverly Development Corporation, 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E.
787 (1929).
RECENT DECISIONS
not be affected by the manner in which the parties treat it.2 Plaintiff,
therefore, could not rely on section 67 of the Personal Property Law 8
to overcome the conditional vendor's reservation of title, since, by the
judicial classification already referred to, gas ranges when attached
to the realty in the usual manner do not become a "part thereof." In
order for the plaintiff to succeed, the doctrine of the Cohen case 4
was necessarily invoked. There a mortgagee whose mortgage con-
tained a personalty clause covering all chattels used in connection with
the mortgaged premises, was held to be a purchaser in good faith
within the statute,5 and as such prevailed over the conditional vendor
whose bill of sale, though prior in time to the mortgage, had not been
filed. In the instant case, the Court concluded that the transaction
consisted of a purchase of the chattels, as independent of the realty,
in the reduction of the purchase price because of the failure of the
builder to install certain specified fixtures. This was held to be an
indication that a definite portion of the purchase money was given as
payment for the furnishings necessary to finish the house according
to contract. The installation of gas ranges was clearly contemplated
by the phrase "in a fashion similar to buildings of the same type in
said location," and hence plaintiff was a purchaser in good faith for
value without notice and as such comes within the protection of the
statute 6 and must prevail over the conditional seller whose bill of
sale was not filed.
J.V.M.
CRIMEs-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW PROFESSIONAL
CRIMINALITY.-The indictment charged the defendant with the crime
of murder in the first degree. The deceased and three other men
were at work repairing an automobile on the street and defendant's
wife claimed that one of them had insulted her. Defendant was
enraged and threatened "to bump them all off." After arming him-
self with a pistol at his apartment, he returned to the scene, where
words and blows were followed by a shot which killed the deceased.
Defendant then threw the pistol in the river. In a confession, he
sought to justify the homicide by saying he had been threatened by
the deceased with a monkey-wrench. Upon the trial, the prosecution
was permitted to prove that at the time of the homicide and arrest
defendant possessed other weapons which were received in evidence.
No claim was made that any of them had been used by the defendant.
Cross-examination brought out the fact that the defendant had no
2McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 469 (1876).
'Laws of 1922, ch. 642, art. 2.
'Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Avenue Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929);(1929) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 131.
'N. Y. Personal Property Law, sec. 65.
'Supra Note 5.
